Congressional Research Service Report: 'U.S. Military Withdrawal & Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan - Frequently Asked Questions' (Part 3 of 4)

Targeted News Service - 8/29/2021

WASHINGTON, Aug. 28 (TNSRep) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following report (No. R46879) on Aug. 27, 2021 entitled "U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions":

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(Continued from Part 2 of 4)

How has the Taliban advance affected the humanitarian situation on the ground in Afghanistan?/199

The humanitarian situation since the Taliban takeover is fragile and subject to change. Humanitarian needs are expected to rise significantly and, where possible, humanitarian organizations are updating assessments. Current conditions could further constrain humanitarian efforts, hinder assistance delivery, and risk the safety of humanitarian personnel. The United Nations has confirmed its commitment to stay, deliver assistance, and support the humanitarian response in Afghanistan,/200 stating that "the humanitarian community--both the U.N. and nongovernmental organizations--remain committed to helping people in Afghanistan."/201 It has also called for a de-escalation in violence and a permanent ceasefire, highlighting its concerns over civilian casualties and the need for humanitarian access to those in need./202 The International Committee of the Red Cross, which has been in Afghanistan since 1987 and has provided assistance across the country (including in Taliban-controlled areas), plans to continue its efforts along with the Afghan Red Crescent Society./203 The status and operational plans of many national and international humanitarian organizations are not publicly available. Some continue to provide services and carry out operations. Others have suspended operations as they assess the operational environment and their capacity to carry out activities. With greater needs on the ground and fewer humanitarian organizations currently able to operate, the burden for providing assistance falls more heavily on those that remain. The international staff footprint could also shift depending on security considerations. To date, the U.S. government has been the largest donor of humanitarian assistance for the Afghan population, including those displaced internally or as refugees.

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199 This section was prepared by Rhoda Margesson, Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy.

200 Humanitarian assistance is provided according to principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.

201 U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, "Statement by Dr. Ramiz Alakbarov, U.N. [Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General] DSRSG and Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator on UN staying to support aid response in Afghanistan, August 17, 2021. UNOCHA, "Daily Noon Briefing Highlights: Afghanistan," August 17, 2021. Specific U.N. entities have issued similar statements.

202 UNHCR, "UNHCR warns Afghanistan's conflict taking the heaviest toll on displaced women and children," August 13, 2021.

203 ICRC, "Afghanistan: A Statement from Robert Mardini, the Director-General of the ICRC," August 17, 2021.

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Prior to the Taliban takeover, Afghanistan already faced a severe humanitarian crisis. An estimated 18.4 million people (out of an estimated population of 35-40 million) were in need of humanitarian and protection assistance,/204 of which more than 3.4 million were displaced./205 In 2021, an estimated one-third of the population was facing emergency and crisis levels of food insecurity, with emergency levels of acute malnutrition in 27 of 34 provinces./206 Conflict and natural disasters (most recently drought conditions) have driven ongoing humanitarian needs, resulting in chronic vulnerability among the general population. Limited resources, government capacity shortcomings, and security constraints on humanitarian operations have contributed to basic needs, especially in recent years, not being fully met./207 Systematic violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law by the Taliban and other armed groups ranged from deliberate attacks on health and education facilities to targeted killings and the forced recruitment of children as child soldiers./208 Escalating conflict in recent months has resulted in increasing numbers of trauma injuries among Afghans. Moreover, the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has exacerbated the humanitarian situation; immediate and secondary impacts contributed to a near doubling of the number of people requiring assistance, from 9.4 million in January 2020 to 18.4 million in January 2021./209 The urgent need to shift programming and resources toward the COVID-19 response also came at the expense of some other humanitarian priorities.

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204 In Afghanistan, many protection concerns exist for vulnerable populations as well as the local staff aiming to assist them. According to the United Nations, for humanitarian organizations, protection is typically about advocating for and supporting ways to reduce and prevent people's exposure to risks and to ensure respect for the rights of individuals in accordance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law. UNOCHA, "Protection." See https://www.unocha.org/es/themes/protection.

205 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA), " Humanitarians seek $1.3 billion to help millions in war-weary Afghanistan," January 12, 2021 and "Afghanistan: Weekly Humanitarian Update (2--8 August 2021): Field Report," August 8, 2021; U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), " UNHCR warns Afghanistan's conflict taking the heaviest toll on displaced women and children," August 13, 2021.

206 U.N. World Food Program (WFP), "WFP Afghanistan: Situation Report," August 16 2021. See also, Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, "Afghanistan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis: March - November 2021," April 2021. High food insecurity is due to a complex mix of factors, such as food prices, reduced income and poverty, conflict, COVID-19 impacts, and natural disasters.

207 The 2021 Afghanistan Humanitarian Response Plan (funding appeal), conducted before the Taliban takeover, totaled $1.3 billion to meet basic needs such as food, water, shelter, protection, and medical services (including those related to COVID-19). As of August 25, 2021, the appeal was 38.8% funded. See U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), Global Humanitarian Overview 2021, May Update, June 8, 2021. See https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/humanitarian_crisis_in_afghanistan_2021.pdf.

208 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, "Afghanistan," June 2021. See also Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed conflict (A/75/873-S/2021/437) issued on 21 June 2021, pp. 3-5.

209 UNOCHA, "Afghanistan: Humanitarian Response Plan (2018-2021) - Year-End Monitoring Report (Jan - Dec 2020)," January 2020. The immediate response to COVID-19 focuses largely on the health and hygiene impacts of the pandemic, while the longer term response to the secondary impacts focuses on protection, food security and livelihoods, nutrition, and education.

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What is that status of Afghan refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and how might the Taliban takeover affect the situation for displaced Afghans?/210

The United Nations and other humanitarian organizations continue to assess the rapidly evolving displacement situation in Afghanistan./211 Prior to the Taliban takeover, the United Nations estimated there were more than 3.4 million IDPs in Afghanistan./212 (In 2021, more than 550,000 Afghans were displaced by conflict inside the country.)/213 Since then, estimates suggest the number of IDPs may be closer to 5 million, but the extent to which Afghans have been displaced by conflict is not known. Most are reportedly staying inside the country, as close to their homes as fighting will allow./214 Reports also indicated that some IDPs have returned home, while others have fled rural areas and arrived in Kabul province and other major cities./215 IDPs are being hosted by friends and family, in public buildings and mosques, or rented accommodation. A growing number were also staying out in the open. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations are providing assistance to IDPs where access is possible.

UNHCR is preparing refugee-receiving countries (specifically Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) for potential new Afghan refugee arrivals./216 The status of border closures with neighboring countries continues to fluctuate, and there is reportedly some population movement back and forth to Pakistan and Iran. The Taliban control exit points on the Afghanistan side of the borders. Although some sources indicate that tens of thousands of Afghans may have crossed international borders in recent weeks, no large-scale international displacement from Afghanistan has been observed./217 Citing the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol as well as customary international law, UNHCR has called on all countries to allow civilians fleeing Afghanistan access to their territories, to support the right to seek asylum, and to ensure respect for the principle of non-refoulement (not to forcibly return refugees)./218 Iran and Pakistan already host over 2.6 million registered Afghan refugees (roughly 85% of all Afghan refugees) from previous waves of displacement./219

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210 This section was prepared by Rhoda Margesson, Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy.

211 Refugees have fled their country of origin because of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons based on race, religion, nationality, or membership in a particular social or political group. Refugees are unwilling or unable to avail themselves of the protection of their home government due to fears of persecution. Once granted refugee status, a person has certain rights and protections under international law. Asylum-seekers, who flee their home country, seek sanctuary in another state where they apply for asylum (i.e., the right to be recognized as a refugee). They may receive legal protection and assistance while their formal status is determined. IDPs have been forced from their homes, often for many of the same reasons as refugees, but have not crossed an international border.

212 UNOCHA, "Humanitarians seek $1.3 billion to help millions in war-weary Afghanistan," January 12, 2021 and "Afghanistan: Weekly Humanitarian Update (2--8 August 2021): Field Report," August 8, 2021; UNHCR, " UNHCR warns Afghanistan's conflict taking the heaviest toll on displaced women and children ," August 13, 2021.

213 UNHCR, "UNHCR Position on Returns to Afghanistan," August 2021.

214 UNHCR, Afghanistan Situation: Supplementary Appeal: July-December 2021, August 2021.

215 UNHCR, UNHCR Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific, "External Update: Afghanistan Situation #2," August 16, 2021.

216 UNHCR, Afghanistan Situation: Supplementary Appeal: July-December 2021, August 2021. UNHCR, UNHCR Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific, "External Update: Afghanistan Situation #2," August 16, 2021.

217 UNHCR, "UNHCR Position on Returns to Afghanistan," August 2021. UNHCR, UNHCR Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific, "External Update: Afghanistan Situation #2," August 16, 2021.

218 UNHCR, "UNHCR Position on Returns to Afghanistan," August 2021.

219 Afghans have been displaced as refugees at different points of conflict over the past four decades. Their sit uation is one of the largest protracted refugee situations in the world. Since 2002, nearly 5.3 million Afghan refugees returned to Afghanistan under UNHCR's facilitated Voluntary Repatriation Program.

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Some additional questions that Congress may consider about the humanitarian and displacement situation include:

* How prepared are the U.S. government and the international community to respond to increased humanitarian assistance and protection needs in Afghanistan in the coming months?

* How might Afghan refugee arrivals in neighboring countries affect political and social conditions there? So far, a large-scale international displacement from Afghanistan has not been observed. What, if any, are the warning signs that it might be likely or imminent? What support to neighboring countries is the United States and international community prepared to provide should arrivals increase? What countries are accepting refugees from Afghanistan?

* How can the international community including the United States help hold a Taliban government accountable to uphold the rights of women and minorities and assure the protection of all vulnerable populations and local staff aiming to assist them?

What are the implications of the Taliban's takeover for counternarcotics?/220

Afghanistan is among the world's most significant sources of illicit drugs, particularly opiates. According to U.S. and U.N. estimates, more than 80% of the world's heroin supply originates in Afghanistan./221 In 2020, an estimated 215,000 hectares of opium poppy was cultivated in Afghanistan--most of which was harvested in areas under Taliban influence or control./222

Afghanistan is also a major source of methamphetamine and cannabis products (e.g., hashish or cannabis resin). The illicit drug trade, just one component of a broader--and thriving--informal economy in which the Taliban have long operated, is a major source of revenue for the Taliban; it is also vital as a driver of employment for agricultural workers in opium poppy cultivation regions of Afghanistan. Opiates have taken a public health toll on the Afghan population, as the country has reported some of the world's highest substance abuse rates in recent years./223

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220 This section was prepared by Liana Rosen, Specialist in International Crime and Narcotics.

221 White House, Office of National Drug Control Policy, "The Office of National Drug Control Policy Releases Data on Afghanistan Poppy Cultivation and Potential Heroin Production," press release, July 16, 2021; U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Vol. 1: Drug and Chemical Control, March 2021, p. 86; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report, Booklet 2: Global Overview, June 2021, p. 51; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report, Booklet 3: Drug Market Trends, June 2021, pp. 68, 87.

222 White House, Office of National Drug Control Policy, "The Office of National Drug Control Policy Releases Data on Afghanistan Poppy Cultivation and Potential Heroin Production," press release, July 16, 2021.

223 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report, Booklet 3: Drug Market Trends, June 2021, p. 108; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "UNODC Reports Major, and Growing, Drug Abuse in Afghanistan," press release, June 21, 2010.

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Uncertainty surrounds the question of what type of counternarcotics posture the Taliban intend to adopt. In 2000, following unsuccessful efforts in 1997 and 1999, the Taliban imposed a short-lived ban that dramatically decreased recorded opium poppy cultivation in 2001./224 A Taliban spokesperson stated on August 17, 2021, that the Taliban envision an elimination of drug production and smuggling in the country--and are seeking international assistance to achieve this goal./225 Some question the credibility of such a posture, and anticipate the prospect of continued Taliban involvement in and reliance on the opium trade as a revenue source, particularly given its importance as a generator of labor-intensive employment and cash liquidity./226 This may include profiting from the taxation of the movement of illicit drug-related products, such as the import of precursor chemicals required in the processing and production of heroin and methamphetamine. Even if the Taliban were to impose an effective ban on the illicit drug trade, revenue opportunities in the informal or grey-zone economy--through a wide range of taxation and extortion schemes--may likely persist or expand./227

Under Afghan Presidents Ashraf Ghani and Hamid Karzai, the U.S. government spent billions of dollars supporting a wide range of capacity-building assistance, training, and mentoring projects for counternarcotics-related ministries, task forces, and law-enforcement units in Afghanistan; U.S. programs also sought to promote alternative licit livelihood options and address drug treatment and rehabilitation services, particularly for women and children.

Some additional issues that Congress may consider as events continue to unfold include

* Whether to continue to support any, some, or all counternarcotics programming in Afghanistan;

* What consequences for human and economic security may result if counternarcotics donor funding to Afghanistan declines; and

* How the counternarcotics policy postures of regional actors, including China, Iran, and Russia, may evolve under the current circumstances./228

How might the Taliban takeover affect Afghanistan's relationships with the International Financial Institutions (IFIs)?/229

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224 U.S. Department of State, "The Taliban And The Afghan Drug Trade," Fact Sheet, December 20, 2000; United Nations International Drug Control Programme, Afghanistan: Annual Opium Poppy Survey 2001, October 2001, p. 11.

225 Joanna Taylor, "Afghanistan 'will not be a country of cultivation of opium anymore', Taliban insists," Independent (UK), August 18, 2021.

226 Jonathan Landay, "Profits and poppy: Afghanistan's illegal drug trade a boon for Taliban," Reuters, August 16, 2021.

227 Graeme Smith and David Mansfield, "The Taliban Have Claimed Afghanistan's Real Economic Prize," New York Times, guest essay, August 18, 2021; United Nations Security Council, Twelfth Report Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, S/2021/486, June 1, 2021, pp. 14-16; Graeme Smith, Resource Flows and Political Power in Afghanistan, Overseas Development Institute, November 2020. See also World Bank, The Long Shadow of Informality: Challenges and Policies, Franziska Ohnsorge and Shu Yu, eds., 2021, https://www.worldbank.org/en/ research/publication/informal-economy.

228 For past criticism, see Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Counternarcotics: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR-18-52-LL, June 14, 2018; see also Tia Sewell, "Where's the U.S. Strategy for Counternarcotics in Afghanistan?," Lawfare, November 18, 2020.

229 This section was prepared by Martin Weiss, Specialist in International Trade and Finance.

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Since rejoining the international community in 2002, Afghanistan has been an active member of IFIs. The World Bank committed $784 million to development projects in Afghanistan in 2021, and $5.3 billion to date./230 The World Bank is the largest single source of funding for Afghanistan's development, financing up to 30% of the country's civilian budget and supporting core functions of the government./231 As of December 2020, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) had extended around $500 million in loans and grants to Afghanistan./232 Multilateral development bank (MDB) financing supports a wide range of endeavors. World Bank financing is largely focused on governance efforts, including macro-fiscal policy and management; finance, private investment, and job creation; public sector governance and anti-corruption; human capital development and service delivery; citizen engagement and social inclusion; urban development and infrastructure; connectivity; and sustainability. ADB financing is focused primarily on large infrastructure projects. Both development banks are also providing Afghanistan COVID-19-related support, such as financing to construct hospitals and train staff.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to a $370 million COVID-19 relief program for Afghanistan in November 2020. Afghanistan also benefitted from the IMF's disbursement of about $220 million under the Fund's Rapid Credit Facility and debt-service relief of about $10 million under a special trust fund. Additionally, Afghanistan is eligible to receive a proportionate share of the recently agreed $650 million Special Drawing Rights (SDR) allocation that is designed to bolster the foreign exchange reserves of member countries./233 The allocation is scheduled to be distributed to member states on August 23, 2021. Under the allocation, Afghanistan would receive around $434 million of SDRs, based on its 0.07% quota in the IMF, bringing its total SDR allocation up to about $653 million.

A key issue is whether the IMF and the MDBs recognize the Taliban as the official government of Afghanistan. While IFI charters are explicit about the requirements for a country's membership, they are largely silent on the issue of representation, leaving the decision to its member countries./234 At the IMF, IMF Press Secretary Gerry Rice released a statement on August 18 that, "[t]here is currently a lack of clarity within the int'l community regarding recognition of a government in Afghanistan, as a consequence of which the country cannot access SDRs or other IMF resources."/235 The United States was also reportedly negotiating to pause the SDR allocation to Afghanistan./236 Some Members of Congress have expressed their concern about Afghanistan's SDR allocation. On August 17, Representative French Hill and 17 other lawmakers wrote to Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen urging the United States to intervene and help prevent Afghanistan from accessing any IMF resources./237

The World Bank suspended funding for dozens of projects in Afghanistan on August 24, citing questions over the legitimacy of Taliban rule. Under World Bank policies, the organization cannot disburse funds when there is no agreement by its 189 member countries on whether a country has a legitimate government. The World Bank completed evacuation of its Kabul-based staff to Islamabad the previous week.

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230 The World Bank in Afghanistan, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan/overview.

231 Josh Zumbrun, "World Bank Freezes Aid to Afghanistan," Wall Street Journal, August 24, 2021.

232 Asian Development Bank Member Fact Sheet, June 2021, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/27747/ afg-2020.pdf.

233 CRS In Focus IF11835, International Monetary Fund: Special Drawing Rights Allocation, by Martin A. Weiss and Rebecca M. Nelson

234 Alison Duxbury, The Participation of States in International Organisations(Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 20.

235 Gerry Rice (@IMFSpokesperson), Twitter, August 18, 2018, available at https://twitter.com/IMFSpokesperson/ status/1428096013374410752

236 Chris Giles et al., "Afghanistan faces 'dire' financial outlook, warns former central bank chief," Financial Times, August 18, 2021.

237 The letter is available at https://hill.house.gov/uploadedfiles/20210817ltrtosecyellenresdrstoafghanistan.pdf.

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What Afghan central bank assets did the Biden Administration put on hold, and what are the potential implications?/238

Afghanistan's central bank (Da Afghanistan Bank) held about $9.5 billion in international reserves, according to a June 2021IMF assessment./239 Most of the central bank's reserves are held outside of Afghanistan. According to the end-2020 central bank balance sheet, $1.3 billion in gold was held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; $3.2 billion was deposited in foreign banks; and $4.2 billion in investments (mostly U.S. government securities) was managed by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the World Bank, and the Bank for International Settlements.

On August 15, 2021 the Biden Administration put a hold on Afghan government reserves held in U.S. bank accounts./240 The status of the central bank's holdings of physical foreign-currency banknotes--about $400 million held primarily at the presidential palace and the central bank's head office--is unclear./241 The central bank's former Acting Governor, Ajmal Ahmady, who fled Kabul, estimated on social media that the funds accessible to the Taliban are 0.1%-0.2% of Afghanistan's total international reserves./242 Taliban members reportedly attempted to inspect the foreign reserves only to be told by central bank officials that they could not access them because they were being stored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York./243

Inability to access international reserves will likely complicate the Taliban's ability to manage the economy. Afghanistan's currency, the afghani, is trading at record lows, and the currency depreciation is expected to fuel inflation. To tame inflation, the Taliban may restrict money leaving the country (impose capital controls). A mix of capital controls and inflation creates a bleak economic outlook for the Afghan people. Further, the Taliban's capacity to manage the economy is questionable. The Taliban named a new acting governor of Afghanistan's central bank, Haji Mohammad Idris, who has no formal economic training. He reportedly headed the Taliban's economic commission, whose activities included collecting illegal taxes from businesses and farmers to fund the militant group's insurgency./244

Some additional questions that Congress may ask the executive branch include

* How do U.S. government officials and outside experts assess Afghanistan's short- to medium-term economic prospects?

* 70%-80% of the Afghanistan government's budget has been funded historically by international donors./245 Without donor funding, how do the Taliban intend to finance the government, including paying government salaries and providing basic services?

* How prepared are the Taliban to administer key economic institutions and maintain critical infrastructure?

* How might economic collapse affect the security and stability of the country and the potential for mass displacement? How might these considerations shape U.S. decisions about sanctions and U.S.-imposed controls on Afghan state assets?

* Arguable points of possible U.S. leverage over the Taliban include development assistance; sanctions (either new ones or relief from existing sanctions); holds on Afghan central bank reserves; and extension of formal recognition. Which of these are the most and least effective?

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238 This section was prepared by Rebecca Nelson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance.

239 International reserves are gold and assets (such as cash, bank deposits, and government securities) denominated in major foreign currencies, such as dollars and euros.

240 Jeff Stein, "Biden Administration Freezes Billions of Dollars in Afghan Reserves, Depriving Taliban of Cash," Washington Post, August 17, 2021.

241 JP Koning, "What Happens to the Afghanistan Central Bank's Assets?," Moneyness Blog, August 17, 2021.

242 Ajmal Ahmady, Twitter, August 18, 2021.

243 Natalie Musumeci, "The Taliban Tried to Get its Hands on the Afghanistan Central Bank's Nearly $ 10 Billion in Reserves, but Most of the Money Is in New York," Business Insider, August 25, 2021,

244 Eltaf Najafizada, "Taliban Name Obscure Official as Central Bank Chief with Crisis Looming," Bloomberg, August 23, 2021.

245 David Lawder, "Taliban Rule Presents Aid Agencies with Moral, Fiscal Dilemma," Reuters, August 24, 2021.

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What is the status of the COVID-19 pandemic in Afghanistan and what are the implications of the Taliban takeover for COVID-19 control and vaccine distribution?/246

As of August 24, 2021, the World Health Organization (WHO), reported that most major health facilities were functional and accessible, though most were experiencing critical shortages in medical supplies./247 WHO also indicated that "service delivery [was] being supported by the Taliban health authorities, though some female health professionals had reportedly resigned or not returned to their post." Some women were also reportedly fearful of leaving their homes, unless for life-threatening conditions. Overcrowding among displaced people has reportedly limited infection prevention measures and increased the risk of transmission of different types of infections, including COVID-19.

As of August 25, 2021, Afghanistan reported more than 150,000 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and 7,000 deaths from the disease./248 Public health responders in the country believe the true figures are likely several times higher due to low testing rates and lack of a national death registration system./249 WHO officials reported on August 24, 2021, that COVID-19 testing had fallen by 77% from the previous epidemiological week./250 Instability has also forced temporary suspension of some COVID-19 responses, particularly plans to establish new diagnostic laboratories, install oxygen plants in hospitals, and expand isolation centers and intensive care unit beds for COVID-19./251

Since the beginning of the pandemic, WHO, UN agencies, and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, have worked with the country's Ministry of Health on the COVID-19 response, including by helping to strengthen laboratory capacity and training vaccinators to deploy the COVID-19 vaccine./252

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246 This section was prepared by Sara Tharakan, Analyst in Global Health and International Development, and Tiaji Salaam-Blyther, Specialist in Global Health.

247 Information in this paragraph is summarized from WHO, "Statement by the WHO Representative in Afghanistan," August 24, 2021.

248 WHO, COVID-19 Dashboard: Afghanistan, accessed on August 26, 2021.

249 Diaa Hadid, "A Crippling 3rd Wave Of COVID Adds To Afghanistan's Woes," NPR, July 3, 2021.

250 Epidemiological week 32 spans from August 15-21, 2021; and epidemiological week 33 spans from August 22-28, 2021.

251 WHO, "Statement by the WHO Representative in Afghanistan," August 24, 2021.

252 Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, Resourceful Optimism: Fighting COVID-19 in Afghanistan, April 20, 2021.

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WHO reported that its work builds on routine health care activities in the country, such as polio immunization campaigns and health systems capacity strengthening./253 As of August 25, 2021, approximately 1.2 million COVID-19 vaccines had been administered in Afghanistan, covering roughly 5% of the country's population./254 As of mid-August 2021, Afghanistan was in phase one of its vaccination campaign, and was vaccinating front-line healthcare workers, media personnel, teachers, and its security and defense forces./255

The implications of the Taliban's takeover, for both Afghan health systems and prospects for COVID-19 control, remain to be seen. WHO and UN agencies have committed to long-term operations in the country, including delivering COVID-19 and polio immunizations (Afghanistan is one of the last countries where polio is endemic)./256 Historically, the Taliban has opposed vaccines, including reportedly committing attacks on health workers providing polio vaccines. In earlier waves of the pandemic, they reportedly assisted domestic and international efforts to combat COVID-19./257 Some observers dismissed the Taliban's response to earlier waves of the pandemic and charged that the Taliban's escalation of violence since 2019 was the main factor impeding the country's response to the pandemic./258 WHO officials have warned that Taliban attacks on health care workers remain a challenge, and have cautioned that going forward, large numbers of internally displaced persons will foster conditions for increased COVID-19 transmission./259 Given these factors, it is unclear whether to, and what extent, any new government formed by the Taliban would assist in COVID-19 control and vaccination campaigns.

How have regional countries reacted to the Taliban's takeover?/260

Russia. Russia's response to the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan has included expressions of both satisfaction and concern. On the one hand, Russian officials and commentators have expressed some satisfaction at the rapid collapse of Afghanistan's government and military after twenty years of U.S. support. Some have framed the outcome as "America's failure" and contrast it to what they characterize as Russia's prudent outreach to the Taliban in recent years./261 At the same time, Russian authorities have long been concerned about instability in Afghanistan and the potential spread of radical Islam, drugs, and refugees throughout the neighboring Central Asia region and into Russia./262

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253 WHO, WHO continues fight against pandemic amid worsening global public health emergency and uneven vaccine rollout, July 20, 2021.

254 WHO, "Statement by the WHO Representative in Afghanistan," August 24, 2021; and WHO, COVID-19 Dashboard: Afghanistan, accessed on August 26, 2021.

255 WHO, WHO continues fight against pandemic amid worsening global public health emergency and uneven vaccine rollout, July 20, 2021.

256 WHO, Statement on Afghanistan by Dr Ahmed Al-Mandhari, WHO Regional Director for the Eastern Mediterranean, August 18, 2021.

257 See Ashley Jackson, "For the Taliban, the Pandemic is a Ladder," Foreign Policy, May 6, 2020, and "The Taliban are joining Afghanistan's fight against covid-19," Economist, May 9, 2020. Abdul Qadir Sediqi and Orooj Hakimi, "Coronavirus makes Taliban realise they need health workers alive not dead," Reuters, March 18, 2020. Ruchi Kumar, "Taliban launches campaign to help Afghanistan fight coronavirus," Al Jazeera, April 6, 2020.

258 Ashley Jackson, "For the Taliban, the Pandemic Is a Ladder," Foreign Policy, May 6, 2020.

259 WHO, Statement on Afghanistan by Dr Ahmed Al-Mandhari, WHO Regional Director for the Eastern Mediterranean, August 18, 2021.

260 This section was prepared by Cory Welt, Specialist in Russian and European Affairs; Andrew Bowen, Analyst in Russian and European Affairs; Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Affairs; Chris Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs; Ken Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs; and Clayton Thomas, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs.

261 Mark Galeotti, "Moscow Watches Kabul's Fall with Some Satisfaction, Much Concern," Moscow Times, August 16, 2021; Felix Light and Pjotr Sauer, "Chaos Engulfs Kabul, Russia Says It's Ready to Work with the Taliban," Moscow Times, August 16, 2021; and Julia Davis, "Russia Is 'Enjoying' America's Failure--and Cozying Up to the Taliban," Daily Beast, August 16, 2021.

262 Nurlan Aliyev, "How Russia Views Afghanistan Today," War on the Rocks, October 19, 2020; Tom Balmforth and Gabrielle Tetrault-Farber, "For Russia, U.S. Afghan Exit Creates Security Threat on Southern Flank," Reuters, July 8, 2021; Robyn Dixon, "Why Afghanistan's Growing Chaos Alarms Leaders from Tajikist an to Russia," Washington Post, July 9, 2021; and Kathy Gannon, Vladimir Isachenkov, and Mstyslav Chernov, "Russia: Afghan Instability Heightens with Hasty U.S. Retreat," Associated Press, July 16, 2021.

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Initial Russian statements suggest the Russian government seeks to build constructive relations with the Taliban while encouraging them to avoid rule by terror and other human rights abuses as they consolidate power. Russian officials have said they have no intention of evacuating the Russian embassy in Kabul and that Taliban forces have pledged to provide security for Russia's embassy and personnel./263 The Russian ambassador to Afghanistan remarked that the current situation in Kabul "is better than it was under Ashraf Ghani."/264 At the same time, Russian authorities say that Russia will continue to consider the Taliban a terrorist organization, until all members of the United Nations Security Council conclude otherwise./265

In recent years, Russian authorities have increased their political and intelligence connections to the Taliban, as well as to other local power brokers in Afghanistan./266 Russia has been party to numerous peace talks and consultations involving a variety of actors, including the Taliban, aimed at securing a negotiated political settlement to Afghanistan's civil conflict. Reports indicate Russia's outreach to the Taliban began years ago, including clandestine political and intelligence contacts and, potentially, military assistance./267

In 2020, media reports stated that U.S. intelligence had uncovered information that Russia's military intelligence agency (the GRU) had offered payments, or "bounties," to Taliban-linked militants to attack U.S. and other international forces in Afghanistan./268 U.S. intelligence agencies reportedly differed in their level of confidence concerning the accuracy of the intelligence and the direct role of the Kremlin in authorizing bounties, but they reportedly shared "high confidence" in the existence of "strong ties ... between Russian operatives and the Afghan network where the bounty claims arose."/269

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263 Yana Pashaeva, "Will Russia and the Taliban Become Friends?" Slate, August 19, 2021. https://slate.com/newsand-politics/2021/08/taliban-afghanistan-russia.html 264 Andrew Osborn, "Russia Says Kabul Seems Safer Under Taliban Than It Was Under Ghani," Reuters, August 16, 2021.

265 Nastassia Astrasheuskaya and Stephanie Findlay, "Russia Seeks to Forge Ties with Taliban as US Troops Leave Afghanistan," FT, July 27, 2021; and Anton Troianovski, "Russian Officials Are Staying in Kabul, Saying They Have Nothing to Fear as Others Race to Leave," New York Times, August 16, 2021.

266 TASS Russian News Agency, "Taliban Delegation Is Currently in Moscow, Representative Says," July 8, 2021; TASS Russian News Agency, "Talks with the Kremlin Are Necessary, Says Kremlin," July 9, 2021; and Maxim Suchkov, "Russia's 'Troubleshooting Tactics' with the Taliban," Middle East Institute, July 14, 2021.

267 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, "Russia is Sending Weapons to Taliban, Top U.S. General Confirms," Washington Post, April 24, 2017; and Mujib Mashal and Michael Schwirtz, "How Russia Built a Channel to the Taliban, Once an Enemy," New York Times, July 13, 2020.

268 Information was gained through captured Afghan militants and financial records which indicated connections between the GRU and Taliban-linked networks. Charlie Savage, Eric Schmitt, and Michael Schwirtz, "Russia Secretly Offered Afghan Militants to Kill U.S. Troops, Intelligence Says," New York Times, June 26, 2020.

269 Charlie Savage, Eric Schmitt, and Michael Schwirtz, "Russian Spy Team Left Traces that Bolstered CIA's Bounty Judgement," New York Times, May 7, 2021.

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Prior to the Taliban's takeover, Russia began planning for contingencies by bolstering its military and security posture in neighboring Central Asia./270 With regional military bases and its leadership of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Russia acts as the primary security guarantor in Central Asia against spillover from Afghanistan./271 In recent months, Russia has bolstered its military presence in Central Asia, including by modernizing its forces in Tajikistan (Russia has an estimated 7,000 troops at the 201st Military Base in Dushanbe), increasing coordination among CSTO members, and conducting multiple military exercises./272 China (People's Republic of China; PRC). China's leaders likely fear unmoderated Taliban control of Afghanistan will enable the spread of terrorism in the region and harm China's security interests. China nevertheless likely will try to foster friendly ties with the Taliban in an attempt to influence the group's activities in ways that protect China's interests./273 The Taliban's takeover has afforded the People's Republic of China an opportunity to criticize the United States and question Washington's credibility with allies and partners./274

After the Taliban proclaimed victory, China's government sent a strong signal that it intends to treat the organization as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Stopping short of formally recognizing it as such and reiterating the PRC's proclaimed foreign policy principle of "noninterference in external affairs," on August 16, 2021, a PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson remarked, "We hope the Afghan Taliban can form solidarity with all factions and ethnic groups in Afghanistan, and build a broad-based and inclusive political structure."/275 The spokesperson cited and welcomed multiple recent Taliban statements relevant to China's interests. These included statements that it would protect foreign missions in the country, support positive relations with China (including China's participation in reconstruction and development in the country), and--perhaps most importantly to China's leaders--prevent Afghan territory from being used to engage in terrorist acts against China./276

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270 Dan De Luce, "Bounties or Not, Russia Has Worked to Expand its Clout in Afghanistan as the U.S. Eyes an Exit," NBC News, June 30, 2020.

271 Vusula Abbasova, "Russia Pledges Military Assistance to Central Asian Allies," Caspian News, July 31, 2021; 272 Reuters, "Russia to Reinforce Military Base in Tajikistan," July 21, 2021; Moscow Times, "Russia to Boost Tajikistan Army Amid Afghanistan 'Deterioration,'" July 28, 2021; Vladimir Isachenkov, "Russia, Central Asian Allies Hold Drills Near Afghanistan," Associated Press, August 10, 2021; and RFE/RL, "Russia Wraps Up Drills With Uzbek and Tajik Troops Near Afghan Border," August 11, 2021.

273 In recent years, and especially since 2019, Beijing has increased engagement with the Taliban as it became apparent that the group would remain a major political and military force in Afghanistan and as China sought to establish a facilitator role for itself in the Afghan reconciliation process. Jason Li, "China's Conflict Mediation in Afghanistan," Stimson Center, August 16, 2021, at https://www.stimson.org/2021/chinas-conflict-mediation-in-afghanistan/?utm_source=Stimson+Center&utm_campaign=9d5166cab8-RA%2FComms%2FAsia+Digest+August&utm_medium= email&utm_term=0_15c3e20f70-9d5166cab8-403780106.

274 Yue Xiaoyong, China's special envoy for Afghan affairs, called the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan "hasty and irresponsible" and other PRC officials and media have offered scathing critiques of the United States. A spokesperson for China'sMinistry of Foreign Affairs remarked on August 17, 2021: " The U.S launched the Afghan War in the name of counterterrorism. But has the U.S. won? After 20 years, the number of terrorist organizations in Afghanistan has grown to more than 20 from a single digit. Has the U.S. brought peace to the Afghan people? For 20 years, more than 100,000 Afghan civilians have been killed or wounded in the gunfire of U.S. troops and its ally forces, and more than 10 million people have been displaced.... Wherever the U.S. sets foot, be it Iraq, Syria or Afghanistan, we see turbulence, division, broken families, deaths and other scars in the mess it has left. The U.S. power and role is destructive rather than constructive." CGTN, "Chinese diplomat: U.S. bears 'inescapable responsibility' for Afghanistan's situation," August 14, 2021, at https://news.cgtn.com/news/2021-08-14/U-S-bears-inescapableresponsibility-for-Afghanistan-s-situation-12IphvoB6Mg/index.html; PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on August 17, 2021," August 17, 2021, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1900083.shtml.

275 The spokesperson further noted, "China respects the Afghan people's right to decide on their own future independently. We are ready to continue to develop good-neighborliness and friendly cooperation with Afghanistan and play a constructive role in Afghanistan's peace and reconstruction." PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on August 16, 2021," August 16, 2021, at http://www.china-un.ch/eng/zgyw/t1899785.htm.

276 China has maintained contacts with the Afghan Taliban to varying degrees over the decades with t he goal of securing commitments from the organization that it would not engage in or otherwise support terrorist acts against China. The PRC engaged more closely with the Taliban starting in the mid-2010s amid reconciliation efforts between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics, Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 128; Andrew Small, "Why Is China Talking to the Taliban?" Foreign Policy, June 21, 2013, at https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/21/why-is-china-talking-to-the-taliban/.

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PRC leaders and experts have long been concerned that Afghanistan-based terrorists pose a "direct threat" to China's national security./277 Afghanistan shares a mountainous 47-mile-long border with China'sXinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, which is home to most of China's predominantly Muslim Uyghur ethnic group./278 Since 2009, Xinjiang has been the site of intensive security measures--including arbitrary mass internment--by the PRC to combat "terrorism, separatism and religious extremism" in response to Uyghur demonstrations, ethnic unrest, and scattered violent incidents purportedly carried out by Uyghurs./279 Chinese leaders fear terrorist groups operating out of Central Asia and Afghanistan either harbor Uyghur terrorists or support Uyghur terrorist groups./280 Chinese officials have asked the Taliban to "make a clean break with" the East Turkistan Islamic Movement, a small group that seeks to establish an independent Islamic state for the Uyghurs./281 Chinese leaders also fear a resurgent Afghan Taliban may empower and embolden regional terrorist groups--including the Pakistani Taliban, which claimed responsibility for an April 2021 car bombing of a Pakistan hotel minutes before the PRC ambassador to the country was scheduled to arrive./282 The hotel bombing was one of three attacks reported to target, injure, or kill PRC nationals in Pakistan since April./283

Iran. Iran opposed the Taliban while the group was formerly in power, with the two sides nearly coming into direct conflict in 1998 when the Taliban killed ten Iranian diplomats in northern Afghanistan. Iran later helped U.S. officials establish the post-Taliban Afghan government in 2001,/284 but, despite its consistent wariness of Taliban intent, Iran has had diplomatic contacts with the Taliban for nearly a decade and appears to be seeking accommodation with the group.

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277 PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Wang Yi Meets with Head of the Afghan Taliban Political Commission Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar," July 28, 2021, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1895950.shtml.

278 Uyghurs are a Turkic ethnic group who practice a moderate form of Sunni Islam.

279 CRS In Focus IF10281, China Primer: Uyghurs, by Thomas Lum and Michael A. Weber.

280 William Yang, "China Ready for 'Friendly Relations' with the Taliban," Independent, August 17, 2021; Janka Oertel and Andrew Small, "After the withdrawal: China's interests in Afghanistan," European Council on Foreign Relations, August 5, 2021.

281 PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Wang Yi Meets with Head of the Afghan Taliban Political Commission Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar Wang Yi Meets with Head of the Afghan Taliban Political Commission Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar," July 28, 2021, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1895950.shtml. The U.S. government designated the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a terrorist organization under Executive Order 13224 in 2002 (to block terrorist financing) and in 2004 placed ETIM on the Terrorist Exclusion List, which bars members of terrorist groups from entering the United States. In November 2020, the Trump Administration removed ETIM from the Terrorist Exclusion List, stating that "for more than a decade, there has been no credible evidence that ETIM continues to exist." In June 2021, however, United Nations sanctions monitors reported that ETIM has hundreds of fighters in Northeast Afghanistan and a larger presence in Idlib, Syria, and moves fighters between the two areas. CRS In Focus IF10281, China Primer: Uyghurs, by Thomas Lum and Michael A. Weber.

282 Asif Shahzad, "Car bombing at hotel in southwest Pakistan kills 4, wounds 11," Reuters, April 21, 2021.

283 Lucas Niewenhuis, " 'Not the outcome China wanted': Why a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan makes Beijing anxious," SupChina, August 16, 2021, at https://supchina.com/2021/08/16/not-the-outcome-china-wanted-why-ataliban-controlled-afghanistan-makes-beijing-anxious/.

284 Barnett Rubin, "A New Look at Iran's Complicated Relationship with the Taliban," War on the Rocks, September 16, 2020.

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Iranian officials have met with the Taliban numerous times since 2018, including hosting a senior Taliban delegation in Tehran in February 2021. U.S. officials have also alleged that the Taliban have received arms and other support from Iran./285 Iran's interests in Afghanistan include preserving its historic influence in western Afghanistan, protecting Afghanistan's Shia minority (the Hazaras), and reducing the flow of refugees into Iran (Iran hosts millions of documented and undocumented Afghans).

Iran has reduced its diplomatic presence in Kabul in response to the Taliban takeover, and may still be wary of the Taliban's aims. The Iranian government appears to view positively the departure of U.S. troops from Afghanistan (which President Ebrahim Raisi characterized as a "defeat") and has called for national unity in Afghanistan./286 Some have speculated that Iran, as it did during the 1990s, might again support Afghans in northern, western, and central Afghanistan against the Taliban, particularly if a Taliban-led government expresses hostility toward Tehran, but there are no indications of such Iranian support to anti-Taliban elements to date./287 Pakistan. Pakistan has played an active and, by many accounts, disruptive and destabilizing role in Afghan affairs for decades. Afghan leaders, along with many U.S. and Western officials, attribute the Taliban's existence--as well as its strength and endurance over the past two decades--to either the active or passive support of Pakistan's military and intelligence services, crucially including Taliban safe havens on Pakistani territory./288 Pakistan's security establishment, fearful of strategic encirclement by India, apparently continues to view the Afghan Taliban as a relatively friendly and reliably anti-India element in Afghanistan, although Pakistani officials claim that their influence over the group is limited./289 Afghanistan-Pakistan relations are further complicated by the presence of at least 1.4 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan (unofficial estimates reach up to 3 million), as well as an historical, ethnically-tinged dispute over their shared 1,600-mile-long border./290

The Trump Administration sought and received Islamabad's assistance in facilitating U.S. talks with the Taliban after 2018, and U.S. assessments of Pakistan's role in this process have generally been more positive since. For example, Special Representative Khalilzad thanked Pakistan for releasing Baradar from custody in October 2018 and for facilitating the travel of Taliban figures to talks in Doha./291 Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin "expressed gratitude" to his Pakistani counterpart in March 2021 for Pakistan's "continued support for the Afghan peace process."/292

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285 Ibid.

286 Maziar Motamedi, "US 'defeat' in Afghanistan a chance for peace: Iran president," Al Jazeera, August 16, 2021.

287 Farzin Nadimi, "Iran Sets Its Eyes on Afghanistan," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 19, 2021.

288 See, for example, "Some Afghans Blame Neighboring Pakistan for Taliban Gains," Associated Press, August 12, 2021; White House, Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia , August 21, 2017, and the July 8, 2021, remarks by a Pentagon spokesperson at https://go.usa.gov/xFeAg.

289 "Imran Khan Urges a New Pakistan-U.S. Bond" (interview), New York Times, June 25, 2021.

290 "Afghans Who Fled the First Taliban Regime Found Precarious Sanctuary in Pakistan," Time, August 18, 2021. Pakistan, the United Nations, and others recognize the 1893 Durand Line as an international boundary, but Afghanistan does not (see Vinay Kaura, "The Durand Line: A British Legacy Plaguing Afghan -Pakistani Relations," Middle East Institute, June 27, 2017).

291 "Mullah Baradar released by Pakistan at the behest of US: Khalilzad," The Hindu, February 9, 2019. Baradar had been imprisoned in Pakistan since his capture in Karachi in a joint U.S.-Pakistani operation in 2010.

292 Baqir Sajjad Syed, "Pentagon chief praises Pakistan's role in Afghan peace process," Dawn, March 23, 2021.

* * *

Many observers see the Taliban's takeover as a substantive triumph for Pakistan, primarily by bolstering its influence in Afghanistan and, correspondingly, through the apparent success of its decades-long efforts to limit Indian influence there./293 By most accounts, these developments provide Pakistan with significant advantages as regional powers jockey for influence in South and Central Asian politics./294 Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan said on August 16, 2021, that, "What is happening in Afghanistan now, they have broken the shackles of slavery."/295 Despite these and other statements of apparent support from Pakistani officials, numerous analysts question whether Pakistan's preferred outcome in Afghanistan is a Taliban-dominated government, in particular one that emerges through military means (which Pakistani leaders continue to deny having sought)./296 In this way, the Taliban takeover appears to be dividing Pakistan's strategic community./297 The Taliban (like past Afghan governments) have not accepted the Durand Line as Afghanistan's border with Pakistan and may exacerbate Pashtun nationalism inside Pakistan, creating a potential flashpoint in future relations./298

Although the mass influx of Afghan refugees that some Pakistanis feared would result from a Taliban takeover has yet to materialize, as of late August 2021, many commentators, including some from Pakistan, express concern about the prospect that the takeover could empower Islamist militant groups that have continued to operate on and from Pakistani territory. Given Pakistan's own experience with domestic Islamist militancy over the past two decades, some analysts doubt that Islamabad would be eager to support a Taliban regime in Kabul in the same manner as it did in the 1990s./299 Yet the threat of increasing jihadism in Afghanistan could have serious implications for Pakistan's internal security. Terrorist groups such as the Islamic State and its regional affiliate, ISKP, have long considered the Pakistani government to be a prime regional adversary and may well be further empowered./300

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293 "The Real Winner of the Afghan War? It's Not Who You Think," New York Times, August 26, 2021; "China, Pakistan and Russia Set to Increase Afghanistan Influence," Guardian (London), August 16, 2021; C. Raja Mohan, "It is Pakistan's Moment of Triumph in Afghanistan, But India Must Bet on Patience" (op-ed), Indian Express(Delhi), August 25, 2021; Sushant Sareen, "Afghanistan: A Military Solution is What Pakistan Wants," Observer Research Foundation (Delhi), June 8, 2021.

294 "Pakistan, China, India Jockey for Position in Afghanistan's New Great Game," Reuters, August 23, 2021.

295 "Taliban Has 'Broken Shackles of Slavery," Says Pak PM Imran Khan," NDTV (Delhi), August 16, 2021.

296 Husain Haqqani, "Pakistan's Pyrrhic Victory in Afghanistan," Foreign Affairs, July 2021; "Pakistan, After Rooting for Afghanistan'sTaliban, Faces a Blowback," Wall Street Journal, July 9, 2021; Hamid Mir, "Pakistanis Aren't Rejoicing Over the Triumph of the Taliban" (op-ed), Washington Post, August 16, 2021.

297 "Pakistan Divided Over Taliban Victories in Afghanistan," Gandhara (Prague), July 19, 2021. In the words of one longtime observer, "many Pakistanis are gloating, while others are warning about the future. We are doing a victory dance, but there is dread in our hearts" (Mohammed Hanif, "In Pakistan, We Cultivated the Taliban, Then We Turned on Them" (op-ed), Guardian (London), August 24, 2021).

298 Madiha Afzal, "An Uneasy Limbo for US-Pakistan Relations Amidst the Withdrawal from Afghanistan," Brookings Institution, August 6, 2021.

299 Madiha Afzal and Michal O'Hanlon, "Why Staying in Afghanistan is the Least Bad Choice for Biden" (op -ed), Washington Post, March 8, 2021; "Enough is Enough: Pakistan Not Happy With Afghan Taliban," News International (Karachi), April 28, 2021.

300 Husain Haqqani, "Pakistan's Pyrrhic Victory in Afghanistan," Foreign Affairs, July 2021; Robin Wright, "Afghanistan, Again, Becomes a Cradle for Jihadism - and Al Qaeda," New Yorker, August 23, 2021; "Zahid Hussein, "Multiple Security Challenges for Pakistan as Afghan War Comes Close to Borders" (op-ed), Arab News (Jeddah), July 17, 2021.

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The Tehreek-e Taliban e Pakistan (TTP or Pakistani Taliban) conducted numerous domestic terrorist attacks that cost thousands of lives from 2007 to 2014. Such incidents were much reduced after Pakistani Army operations in western Pakistan in 2014, but the group appears to be resurging in 2021. The Afghan Taliban have, as part of their takeover, freed thousands of prisoners from Afghan government jails, including some high ranking TTP figures. The TTP, which is distinct from but has significant ideological ties to the Afghan Taliban, apparently have renewed their "allegiance to the Islamic Emirate" in Afghanistan, and the two groups reportedly have been described as "two faces of the same coin" by top Pakistani security officials./301

India. New Delhi'sAfghanistan policies have been conceived largely through the lens of competition and proxy conflict with India's rivals in Pakistan. New Delhi's interests have primarily focused on limiting the activities and reach of numerous regional Islamist, anti-India terrorist groups. India also has a keen interest in securing connectivity with and access to Central Asia, which Pakistan presently obstructs./302 Like Iran and Russia, India supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in the 1990s and backed the elected post-2001 Afghan government (with significant development assistance), but reportedly established some communications with the Taliban in recent months./303 India had been a key regional supporter of the former Afghan government, providing more than $3 billion in development assistance across Afghanistan. Any gains accrued through this "soft power" emphasis on infrastructure and social services may be lost with the Taliban takeover./304 India has evacuated most of its personnel and shuttered its diplomatic operations in Afghanistan.

The Taliban takeover in Kabul has sent shockwaves through India's strategic and security communities, which predict Islamist militant gains to benefit anti-India terrorist groups, especially those oriented toward Kashmir, such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Jaish-eMohammed (JeM), both of which have conducted major terrorist attacks in India. The developments also could present India with a "consolidated front" comprised of China, Pakistan, and the Taliban./305 Many other analyses take a similar view, warning of a broad resurgence of regional Islamist militancy that will target India and its interests./306 Thousands of LeT and JeM militants, many of them Pakistani nationals, reportedly have fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan./307 Taliban military chiefs, notably including those from the vehemently anti-India Haqqani Network, are said to be coordinating with their LeT and JeM counterparts./308 According to at least one assessment, "These are individuals who have trained with the Pakistani military."/309

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301 "Pakistani Taliban's Emir Renews Allegiance to Afghan Taliban," Long War Journal, August 19, 2021; "Pakistani Army Warns of Blowback in Crackdown on Afghan Taliban," Gandhara (Prague), July 2, 2021. See also Abdul Basit, "A Taliban Takeover Will Strengthen Pakistan's Jihadis," Foreign Policy, August 17, 2021.

302 Suhasini Haidar, "Taliban gains complicate India's options," The Hindu, August 13, 2021.

303 "In a Huge Shift, India Opens Channels with Afghan Taliban Factions and Leaders," Hindustan Times (Delhi), June 9, 2021; "Indian Delegation Met Taliban in Doha, Says Qatari Official," Hindu (Chennai), June 21, 2021.

304 Aparna Pande, "India in the Eye of the Taliban" (op-ed), The Hill, August 23, 2021.

305 Avinash Paliwal, "A Strategic Shock for the Subcontinent" (op-ed), Hindustan Times(Delhi), August 25, 2021; "Taliban Advances in Afghanistan Give Kashmir Militants a Boost," Der Welte (Berlin), July 8, 2021.

306 See, for example, Kabir Taneja and Mohamed Sinan Siyech, "Terrorism in South Asia After the Fall of Afghanistan," War on the Rocks, August 23, 2021.

307 "Pak's Terror Groups Join Taliban War, India Wary," Hindustan Times(Delhi), July 11, 2021.

308 Ibid.

309 Rudra Chaudhuri, "Will the Taliban Keep Their Promises in Afghanistan?," Atlantic Council, August 17, 2021 .

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Pakistan's main intelligence service allegedly has colluded with Taliban elements to attack Indian targets in Afghanistan./310

Several Indian analysts have issued harsh criticisms of the "precipitous" U.S. withdrawal and its implications for India; others have raised new questions about American credibility as a strategic partner for India as it seeks to balance against China./311 At the same time, some commentators foresee a circumstance in which the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, with its attendant reduced American reliance on Pakistan, may benefit New Delhi's efforts to address Pakistan going forward./312 For some, the Taliban takeover marks major a turning point in regional geopolitics; in the words of one senior analyst, it means for India "greater cooperation with Washington, deeper conflicts with Beijing, and wider fissures in the traditional strategic partnership with Moscow."/313

Gulf States. The Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf are longtime security partners of the United States and host U.S. forces at military bases on their territory, many of which have been used for U.S. operations in Afghanistan since 2001.

The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia were the two states that, along with Pakistan,

recognized the pre-2001 Taliban government. It is unclear whether they or any other Gulf state would recognize a new Taliban-led government, and, if so, whether or how any future Gulf state relations with a Taliban government may affect U.S. use of Gulf bases to conduct counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates are temporarily hosting Afghan nationals evacuated by U.S. and coalition operations since mid-August. Secretary of State Blinken has thanked officials from those countries for their support and has thanked Kuwait for facilitating the transit of U.S. government personnel and U.S. citizens evacuated from Afghanistan.

Gulf state officials are likely to consider how Taliban governance and security conditions in Afghanistan affect the threats posed by transnational terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. Humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan, the effects of the situation there on the government of Pakistan, and Taliban-Iran relations are other relevant considerations for Gulf policymakers. The UAE announced on August 18 that it had "welcomed" Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and his wife on "humanitarian grounds," possibly attracting Taliban ire.

Qatar hosted U.S.-Taliban talks after 2018 and continues to host senior Taliban leaders in Doha. Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani said on August 23, "We remain that impartial mediator throughout this process." Saudi Arabia'sForeign Ministry released a statement on August 17 calling for all parties in Afghanistan to preserve life and property and declaring that "the kingdom stands with the choices that the Afghan people make without interference."

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310 "Pakistani Fighters, Taliban Instructed to Target Indian Assets in Afghanistan, Sources Say," India Today (Delhi), July 18, 2021.

311 See, for example, Brahma Chellaney, "Biden's Afghan Blunder," Project Syndicate, July 13, 2021; Aparna Pande, "India in the Eye of the Taliban" (op-ed), The Hill, August 23, 2021.

312 Rajesh Rajagopalan, "A US Not Tied in Afghanistan Only Helps India Deal with Pakistan Problem Better" (op-ed), The Print (Delhi), August 23, 2021.

313 C. Raja Mohan, "Post-American Afghanistan and India's Geopolitics," Foreign Policy, August 18, 2021.

Continues with Part 4 of 4

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View figure and report at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46879